1. The most efficient provably secure IA-DHKE protocol to date, and the first online-optimal provably secure IA-DHKE protocols.
2. The first IA-DHKE protocol that is provably secure, resilience to the leakage of DH components and exponents, under merely standard assumptions without additionally relying on the knowledge-of-exponent assumption (KEA).
3. The first provably secure privacy-preserving and computationally fair IA-DHKE protocol, with privacy-preserving properties of reasonable deniability and post-ID computability and the property of session-key computational fairness.
Guided by our new design rationales, in this work we also formalize and introduce some new concept, say session-key computational fairness (as a complement to session-key security), to the literature.
Category / Keywords: Implicit authentication, Diffie-Hellman key exchange Publication Info: The results originally appeared in a Chinese patent in 2007, and later in a PCT patent in 2008 (with the 2007 patent as priority reference). More details and protocol variants can also be found in the patent files. Date: received 20 Jan 2011, last revised 11 Oct 2012 Contact author: yunleizhao at gmail com Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation Note: A more formal treatment of the YZ-KE protocols in the original version Version: 20121011:090954 (All versions of this report) Short URL: ia.cr/2011/035 Discussion forum: Show discussion | Start new discussion