Paper 2011/001

Practical Frameworks For $h$-Out-Of-$n$ Oblivious Transfer With Security Against Covert and Malicious Adversaries

Zeng Bing, Tang Xueming, Xu Peng, and Jing Jiandu

Abstract

We present two practical frameworks for $h$-out-of-$n$ oblivious transfer ($OT^{n}_{h}$). The first one is secure against covert adversaries who are not always willing to cheat at any price. The security is proven under the ideal/real simulation paradigm (call such security fully simulatable security). The second one is secure against malicious adversaries who are always willing to cheat. It provides fully simulatable security and privacy respectively for the sender and the receiver (call such security one-sided simulatable security). The two frameworks can be implemented from the decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption, the decisional $N$-th residuosity assumption, the decisional quadratic residuosity assumption and so on. The DDH-based instantiation of our first framework costs the minimum communication rounds and the minimum computational overhead, compared with existing practical protocols for oblivious transfer with fully simulatable security against covert adversaries or malicious adversaries. Though our second framework is not efficient, compared with existing practical protocols with one-sided simulatable security against malicious adversaries. However, it first provides a way to deal with general $OT^{n}_{h}$ on this security level. What is more, its DDH-based instantiation is more efficient than the existing practical protocols for oblivious transfer with fully simulatable security against malicious adversaries.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Major revision. IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security 7(2): 465-479, 2012
DOI
10.1109/TIFS.2012.2184096
Keywords
oblivious transfersecure two-party computation
Contact author(s)
zeng bing zb @ gmail com
History
2016-03-20: revised
2011-01-05: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2011/001
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2011/001,
      author = {Zeng Bing and Tang Xueming and Xu Peng and Jing Jiandu},
      title = {Practical Frameworks For $h$-Out-Of-$n$  Oblivious Transfer With Security Against  Covert and Malicious  Adversaries},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2011/001},
      year = {2011},
      doi = {10.1109/TIFS.2012.2184096},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2011/001}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2011/001}
}
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