We show that consideration of such attacks (which received little attention in recent years) serves an important role in assessing the security of block ciphers and of other cryptographic primitives based on block ciphers. In particular, we show that these attacks can be leveraged to more complex attacks, either on the block cipher itself or on other primitives (e.g., stream ciphers, MACs, or hash functions) that use a small number of rounds of the block cipher as one of their components.
As a case study, we consider the AES --- the most widely used block cipher, whose round function is used in various cryptographic primitives. We present attacks on up to four rounds of AES that require at most 10 known/chosen plaintexts. We then apply these attacks to cryptanalyze a variant of the stream cipher LEX, and to mount a new known plaintext attack on 6-round AES.
Category / Keywords: secret-key cryptography / AES, Cryptanalysis, Side Channel Attacks, Slide Attacks, LEX Date: received 12 Dec 2010, last revised 23 Feb 2011 Contact author: orr dunkelman at weizmann ac il Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation Version: 20110223:175544 (All versions of this report) Short URL: ia.cr/2010/633 Discussion forum: Show discussion | Start new discussion