Paper 2010/624

No-leak authentication by the Sherlock Holmes method

Dima Grigoriev and Vladimir Shpilrain

Abstract

We propose a class of authentication schemes that are literally zero-knowledge, as compared to what is formally defined as ``zero-knowledge" in cryptographic literature. We call this ``no-leak" authentication to distinguish from an established ``zero-knowledge" concept. The ``no-leak" condition implies ``zero-knowledge" (even ``perfect zero-knowledge"), but it is actually stronger, as we illustrate by examples. The principal idea behind our schemes is: the verifier challenges the prover with questions that he (the verifier) already knows answers to; therefore, even a computationally unbounded verifier who follows the protocol cannot possibly learn anything new during any number of authentication sessions. This is therefore also true for a computationally unbounded passive adversary.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Keywords
authenticationzero knowledge
Contact author(s)
shpil @ groups sci ccny cuny edu
History
2012-02-08: revised
2010-12-08: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2010/624
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2010/624,
      author = {Dima Grigoriev and Vladimir Shpilrain},
      title = {No-leak authentication by the Sherlock Holmes method},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2010/624},
      year = {2010},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2010/624}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2010/624}
}
Note: In order to protect the privacy of readers, eprint.iacr.org does not use cookies or embedded third party content.