We propose an efficient PPSS protocol in the public key model, i.e. where the device can remember a trusted public key, provably secure under the DDH assumption, using non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs which are efficiently instantiatable in the Random Oracle Model (ROM). The resulting protocol is robust and practical, with fewer than $4t+12$ exponentiations per party, and with only three messages exchanged between the user and each server, implying a single round of interaction in the on-line phase. As a side benefit our PPSS protocol yields a new Threshold Password Authenticated Key Exchange (T-PAKE) protocol in the public key model which is significantly faster than existing T-PAKE's provably secure in the public key model in ROM.
Category / Keywords: cryptographic protocols / Secret Sharing; Intrusion Tolerance; Password Authentication Publication Info: not published before, under conference submission Date: received 3 Nov 2010, last revised 5 Nov 2010 Contact author: stasio at ics uci edu Available formats: Postscript (PS) | Compressed Postscript (PS.GZ) | PDF | BibTeX Citation Version: 20101105:211652 (All versions of this report) Discussion forum: Show discussion | Start new discussion