A Note on Zero-Knowledge Proofs of Knowledge and the ZKPOK Ideal Functionality

Carmit Hazay; Yehuda Lindell

Paper 2010/552

A Note on Zero-Knowledge Proofs of Knowledge and the ZKPOK Ideal Functionality

Carmit Hazay and Yehuda Lindell

Abstract

In this note, we provide a formal proof of the fact that any protocol that is a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge for a relation $R$ is also a secure protocol for the zero-knowledge proof of knowledge functionality, where the latter is defined according to the standard framework of stand-alone secure computation. Although this is a well-known fact, to the best of our knowledge, no full proof of this has been published.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Foundations
Publication info: Published elsewhere. This is an excerpt from the book "Efficent Secure Two-Party Protocols" by the authors.
Contact author(s): lindell @ cs biu ac il
History: 2010-11-01: received
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2010/552
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2010/552,
      author = {Carmit Hazay and Yehuda Lindell},
      title = {A Note on Zero-Knowledge Proofs of Knowledge and the {ZKPOK} Ideal Functionality},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2010/552},
      year = {2010},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2010/552}
}