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Paper 2010/500
ATTACKS ON THE AKACP PROTOCOL
Konstantinos Chalkias and Foteini Baldimtsi and Dimitrios Hristu-Varsakelis and Spyros T. Halkidis and George Stephanides
Abstract
We discuss a recently proposed one-pass authenticated key agreement protocol, by Mohammad, Chen, Hsu and Lo, which was “derived” from their correponding two-pass version and claimed to be secure. We show that this is not the case by demonstrating a number of vulnerabilities.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
- PS
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
- Keywords
- impersonation attackskey agreementloss of informationkey compromisedenial of service.
- Contact author(s)
- chalkias @ java uom gr
- History
- 2012-08-02: last of 2 revisions
- 2010-09-30: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2010/500
- License
-
CC BY
