Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2010/500
ATTACKS ON THE AKACP PROTOCOL
Konstantinos Chalkias and Foteini Baldimtsi and Dimitrios Hristu-Varsakelis and Spyros T. Halkidis and George Stephanides
Abstract: We discuss a recently proposed one-pass authenticated key agreement protocol, by Mohammad, Chen, Hsu
and Lo, which was “derived” from their correponding two-pass version and claimed to be secure. We show
that this is not the case by demonstrating a number of vulnerabilities.
Category / Keywords: impersonation attacks, key agreement, loss of information, key compromise, denial of service.
Date: received 29 Sep 2010, last revised 2 Aug 2012
Contact author: chalkias at java uom gr
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Version: 20120802:171023 (All versions of this report)
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