Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2010/479
Side-Channel Attacks on the McEliece and Niederreiter Public-Key Cryptosystems
R.M. Avanzi and S. Hoerder and D. Page and M. Tunstall
Abstract: Research within “post-quantum” cryptography has focused on development of schemes that resist quantum cryptanalysis. However, if such schemes are to be deployed, practical questions of efficiency and physical security should also be addressed; this is particularly important for embedded systems. To this end, we investigate issues relating to side-channel attack against the McEliece and Niederreiter public-key cryptosystems, for example improving those presented by , and novel countermeasures against such attack.
Category / Keywords: public-key cryptography / post-quantum cryptography, McEliece, Niederreiter, side-channel attacks
Date: received 10 Sep 2010, last revised 14 Sep 2010
Contact author: hoerder at compsci bristol ac uk
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Note: Added a reference that appeared after we've written the paper but before we submitted it to eprint.
Version: 20100914:091521 (All versions of this report)
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