Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2010/440
Piret and Quisquater's DFA on AES Revisited
Christophe Giraud and Adrian Thillard
Abstract: At CHES 2003, Piret and Quisquater published a very efficient DFA on AES which has served as a basis for many variants published afterwards. In this paper, we revisit P&Q's DFA on AES and we explain how this attack can be much more efficient than originally claimed. In particular, we show that only 2 (resp. 3) faulty ciphertexts allow an attacker to efficiently recover the key in the case of AES-192 (resp. AES-256). Our attack on AES-256 is the most efficient attack on this key length published so far.
Category / Keywords: DFA, AES
Date: received 13 Aug 2010, last revised 16 May 2011
Contact author: c giraud at oberthur com
Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation
Note: Small update to emphasize the contribution of this paper.
Version: 20110516:083528 (All versions of this report)
Short URL: ia.cr/2010/440
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