Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2010/385
First-Order Side-Channel Attacks on the Permutation Tables Countermeasure –Extended Version–
Emmanuel Prouff and Robert McEvoy
Abstract: The use of random permutation tables as a side-channel attack countermeasure was recently proposed by Coron . The countermeasure operates by ensuring that during the execution of an algorithm, each intermediate variable that is handled is in a permuted form described by the random permutation tables. In this paper, we examine the application of this countermeasure to the AES algorithm as described in , and show that certain operations admit first-order side-channel leakage. New side-channel attacks are developed to exploit these flaws, using correlation-based and mutual information-based methods. The attacks have been verified in simulation, and in practice on a smart card.
Category / Keywords: implementation / Side Channel Attack, Countermeasure, AES
Publication Info: A short version of this paper has been published in the proceedings of CHES 2009 conference.
Date: received 7 Jul 2010
Contact author: e prouff at oberthur com
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Version: 20100707:191343 (All versions of this report)
Short URL: ia.cr/2010/385
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