Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2010/345
Robust RFID Authentication Protocol with Formal Proof and Its Feasibility
Miyako Ohkubo, Shin'ichiro Matsuo, Yoshikazu Hanatani, Kazuo Sakiyama and Kazuo Ohta
Abstract: The proloferation of RFID tags enhances everyday activities, such as by letting us reference the price, origin and circulation route of specific goods. On the other hand, this lecel of traceability gives rise to new privacy issues and the topic of developing cryptographic protocols for RFID- tags is garnering much attention. A large amount of research has been conducted in this area. In this paper, we reconsider the security model of RFID- authentication with a man-in-the-middle adversary and communication fault. We define model and security proofs via a game-based approach makes our security models
compatible with formal security analysis tools. We show that an
RFID authentication protocol is robust against the above attacks, and
then provide game-based (hand-written) proofs and their erification by using CryptoVerif.
Category / Keywords: RFID, authentication, privacy
Date: received 16 Jun 2010, last revised 27 Feb 2011
Contact author: m ohkubo at nict go jp
Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation
Note: There were some typos. Those are corrected.
Version: 20110228:030905 (All versions of this report)
Short URL: ia.cr/2010/345
Discussion forum: Show discussion | Start new discussion
[ Cryptology ePrint archive ]