Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2010/256

On the Public Key Replacement and Universal Forgery Attacks of Short Certificateless Signature

Mingwu Zhang, Tsuyoshi Takagi, Bo Yang

Abstract: Certificateless cryptography eliminates the need of certificates in the PKI and solves the inherent key escrow problem in the ID-based cryptography. Recently, Du and Wen proposed a short certi¯cateless signature scheme without MapToPoint hash function, and the signature size is short enough with only half of the DSA signature. In this paper, after the detailing the formal of certificateless signature scheme, we show that the Du and Wen's short certificateless signature scheme is insecure which is broken by a type-I adversary who has the ability in replacing users' public keys and accessing to the signing oracles, and it also cannot resist on the universal forgery attack for any third user.

Category / Keywords: public-key cryptography /

Date: received 5 May 2010, withdrawn 8 May 2010

Contact author: csmwzhang at gmail com

Available formats: (-- withdrawn --)

Version: 20100508:133710 (All versions of this report)

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