In this paper, we therefore propose a new, widely applicable definition of accountability, with interpretations both in symbolic and computational models. Our definition reveals that accountability is closely related to verifiability, for which we also propose a new definition. We prove that verifiability can be interpreted as a restricted form of accountability. Our findings on verifiability are of independent interest.
As a proof of concept, we apply our definitions to the analysis of protocols for three different tasks: contract-signing, voting, and auctions. Our analysis unveils some subtleties and unexpected weaknesses, showing in one case that the protocol is unusable in practice. However, for this protocol we propose a fix to establish a reasonable level of accountability.Category / Keywords: cryptographic protocols / Accountability, Verifiability, Protocol Analysis, E-Voting, Auction, Contract Signing Original Publication (with minor differences): Proceedings of the 17th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (ACM CCS 2010) Date: received 27 Apr 2010, last revised 2 Feb 2015 Contact author: kuesters at uni-trier de Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation Note: Added publication information as well as some explanation in Section 5.2. Version: 20150202:163211 (All versions of this report) Short URL: ia.cr/2010/236 Discussion forum: Show discussion | Start new discussion