Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2010/219

Tracker: Security and Privacy for RFID-based Supply Chains

Erik-Oliver Blass and Kaoutar Elkhiyaoui and Refik Molva

Abstract: The counterfeiting of pharmaceutics or luxury objects is a major threat to supply chains today. As different facilities of a supply chain are distributed and difficult to monitor, malicious adversaries can inject fake objects into the supply chain. This paper presents Tracker, a protocol for object genuineness verification in RFID-based supply chains. More precisely, Tracker allows to securely identify which (legitimate) path an object/tag has taken through a supply chain. Tracker provides privacy: an adversary can neither learn details about an object's path, nor can it trace and link objects in supply chain. Tracker's security and privacy is based on an extension of polynomial signature techniques for run-time fault detection using homomorphic encryption. Contrary to related work, RFID tags in this paper are not required to perform \emph{any computation}, but only feature a few bytes of storage such as ordinary EPC Class 1 Gen 2 tags.

Category / Keywords: cryptographic protocols / RFID, privacy, supply chain management, counterfeiting

Date: received 19 Apr 2010, last revised 4 Feb 2011

Contact author: erik-oliver blass at eurecom fr

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20110204:160318 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2010/219

Discussion forum: Show discussion | Start new discussion