Composable Security Analysis of OS Services

Ran Canetti; Suresh Chari; Shai Halevi; Birgit Pfitzmann; Arnab Roy; Michael Steiner; Wietse Venema

Paper 2010/213

Composable Security Analysis of OS Services

Ran Canetti, Suresh Chari, Shai Halevi, Birgit Pfitzmann, Arnab Roy, Michael Steiner, and Wietse Venema

Abstract

We provide an analytical framework for analyzing basic integrity properties of file systems, namely the binding of files to filenames and writing capabilities. A salient feature of our modeling and analysis is that it is *composable*: In spite of the fact that we analyze the filesystem in isolation, security is guaranteed even when the file system operates as a component within an arbitrary, and potentially adversarial system. Such secure composability properties seem essential when trying to assert the security of large systems. Our results are obtained by adapting the *Universally Composable* (UC) security framework to the analysis of software systems. Originally developed for cryptographic protocols, the UC framework allows the analysis of simple components in isolation, and provides assurance that these components maintain their behavior when combined in a large system, potentially under adversarial conditions.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Applications
Publication info: Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Keywords: Composable Security File-System Security Formal Models Software Security
Contact author(s): shaih @ alum mit edu
History: 2011-04-27: revised; 2010-04-19: received; See all versions
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2010/213
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2010/213,
      author = {Ran Canetti and Suresh Chari and Shai Halevi and Birgit Pfitzmann and Arnab Roy and Michael Steiner and Wietse Venema},
      title = {Composable Security Analysis of {OS} Services},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2010/213},
      year = {2010},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2010/213}
}