## Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2010/200

Generic Constructions for Verifiably Encrypted Signatures without Random Oracles or NIZKs

Markus Rückert and Michael Schneider and Dominique Schröder

Abstract: Verifiably encrypted signature schemes (VES) allow a signer to encrypt his or her signature under the public key of a trusted third party, while maintaining public signature verifiability.

With our work, we propose two generic constructions based on Merkle authentication trees that do not require non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs (NIZKs) for maintaining verifiability. Both are stateful and secure in the standard model. Furthermore, we extend the specification for VES, bringing it closer to real-world needs. We also argue that statefulness can be a feature in common business scenarios.

Our constructions rely on the assumption that CPA (even slightly weaker) secure encryption, maskable'' CMA secure signatures, and collision resistant hash functions exist. Maskable'' means that a signature can be hidden in a verifiable way using a secret masking value. Unmasking the signature is hard without knowing the secret masking value.

We show that our constructions can be instantiated with a broad range of efficient signature and encryption schemes, including two lattice-based primitives. Thus, VES schemes can be based on the hardness of worst-case lattice problems, making them secure against subexponential and quantum-computer attacks.

Among others, we provide the first efficient pairing-free instantiation in the standard model.

Category / Keywords: public-key cryptography / Generic construction, Merkle tree, post-quantum, standard model

Date: received 10 Apr 2010, last revised 17 Apr 2010

Contact author: markus rueckert at cased de

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Note: Preliminary draft.

Short URL: ia.cr/2010/200

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