Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2010/191

On Designated Verifier Signature Schemes

Michal Rjaško and Martin Stanek

Abstract: Designated verifier signature schemes allow a signer to convince only the designated verifier that a signed message is authentic. We define attack models on the unforgeability property of such schemes and analyze relationships among the models. We show that the no-message model, where an adversary is given only public keys, is equivalent to the model, where an adversary has also oracle access to the verification algorithm. We also show a separation between the no-message model and the chosen-message model, where an adversary has access to the signing algorithm. Furthermore, we present a modification of the Yang-Liao designated verifier signature scheme and prove its security. The security of the modified scheme is based on the computational Diffie-Hellman problem, while the original scheme requires strong Diffie-Hellman assumption.

Category / Keywords: public-key cryptography /

Date: received 7 Apr 2010, last revised 29 Jun 2010

Contact author: rjasko at dcs fmph uniba sk

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Version: 20100629:123923 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2010/191

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