Paper 2010/165
Comment on four two-party authentication protocols
Yalin Chen, Jue-Sam Chou, and Chun-Hui Huang
Abstract
In this paper, we analyze the protocols of Bindu et al., Goriparthi et al., Wang et al. and Hölbl et al.. After analyses, we found that Bindu et al.’s protocol suffers from the insider attack if the smart card is lost, both Goriparthi et al.’s and Wang et al.’s protocols can’t withstand the DoS attack on the password change phase which makes the password invalid after the protocol run, and Hölbl et al.’s protocol is vulnerable to the insider attack since a malevolent legal user can deduce KGC’s secret key xs.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
- Keywords
- password authentication protocolinsider attackdenial-of-service attacksmart card lost problemmutual authenticationman-in-the-middle attack
- Contact author(s)
- jschou @ mail nhu edu tw
- History
- 2010-03-28: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2010/165
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2010/165,
author = {Yalin Chen and Jue-Sam Chou and Chun-Hui Huang},
title = {Comment on four two-party authentication protocols},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2010/165},
year = {2010},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2010/165}
}
