Paper 2010/147
A New Framework for Password-Based Authenticated Key Exchange
Adam Groce and Jonathan Katz
Abstract
Protocols for password-based authenticated key exchange (PAKE) allow two users who share only a short, low-entropy password to agree on a cryptographically strong session key. The challenge in designing such protocols is that they must be immune to off-line dictionary attacks in which an eavesdropping adversary exhaustively enumerates the dictionary of likely passwords in an attempt to match a password to the set of observed transcripts. To date, few general frameworks for constructing PAKE protocols in the standard model are known. Here, we abstract and generalize a protocol by Jiang and Gong to give a new methodology for realizing PAKE without random oracles, in the common reference string model. In addition to giving a new approach to the problem, the resulting construction offers several advantages over prior work. We also describe an extension of our protocol that is secure within the universal composability~(UC) framework and, when instantiated using El Gamal encryption, is more efficient than a previous protocol of Canetti et al.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. ACM CCCS 2010
- Keywords
- password-based key exchange
- Contact author(s)
- jkatz @ cs umd edu
- History
- 2010-06-22: revised
- 2010-03-20: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2010/147
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2010/147,
author = {Adam Groce and Jonathan Katz},
title = {A New Framework for Password-Based Authenticated Key Exchange},
howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2010/147},
year = {2010},
note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2010/147}},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2010/147}
}
