CCA-Secure PRE Scheme without Random Oracles

Jun Shao; Zhenfu Cao; Peng Liu

Paper 2010/112

CCA-Secure PRE Scheme without Random Oracles

Jun Shao, Zhenfu Cao, and Peng Liu

Abstract

In a proxy re-encryption scheme, a semi-trusted proxy can transform a ciphertext under Alice's public key into another ciphertext that Bob can decrypt. However, the proxy cannot access the plaintext. Due to its transformation property, proxy re-encryption can be used in many applications, such as encrypted email forwarding. In this paper, by using the techniques of Canetti-Hohenberger and Kurosawa-Desmedt, we propose a new single-use unidirectional proxy re-encryption scheme. Our proposal is secure against chosen ciphertext attack (CCA) and collusion attack in the standard model.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Public-key cryptography
Publication info: Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Keywords: proxy re-encryption
Contact author(s): chn junshao @ gmail com
History: 2010-03-04: received
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2010/112
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2010/112,
      author = {Jun Shao and Zhenfu Cao and Peng Liu},
      title = {{CCA}-Secure {PRE} Scheme without Random Oracles},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2010/112},
      year = {2010},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2010/112}
}