Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2010/108
Perfectly Secure Oblivious RAM Without Random Oracles
Ivan Damg\aa{}rd and Sigurd Meldgaard and Jesper Buus Nielsen
Abstract: We present an algorithm for implementing a secure oblivious
RAM where the access pattern is perfectly hidden in the information
theoretic sense, without assuming that the CPU has access to a random
oracle. In addition we prove a lover bound on the amount of randomness
needed for information theoretically secure oblivious RAM.
Category / Keywords: protocols, oblivious RAM
Date: received 27 Feb 2010, last revised 1 Mar 2010
Contact author: ivan at cs au dk, stm@cs au dk, jbn@cs au dk
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Version: 20100302:063920 (All versions of this report)
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