Paper 2010/080
Secrecy-Oriented First-Order Logical Analysis of Cryptographic Protocols
Gergei Bana, Koji Hasebe, and Mitsuhiro Okada
Abstract
We present a computationally sound first-order system for security analysis of protocols that places secrecy of nonces and keys in its center. Even trace properties such as agreement and authentication are proven via proving a non-trace property, namely, secrecy first. This results a very powerful system, the working of which we illustrate on the agreement and authenti- cation proofs for the Needham-Schroeder-Lowe public-key and the amended Needham-Schroeder shared-key protocols in case of unlimited sessions. Unlike other available formal verification techniques, computational soundness of our approach does not require any idealizations about parsing of bitstrings or unnecessary tagging. In particular, we have total control over detecting or eliminating the possibility of type-flaw attacks.
Note: Minor corrections
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
- Keywords
- cryptographic protocolsformal methodsfirst order logiccomputational semantics
- Contact author(s)
- bana @ math upenn edu
- History
- 2010-07-20: last of 4 revisions
- 2010-02-16: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2010/080
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2010/080,
author = {Gergei Bana and Koji Hasebe and Mitsuhiro Okada},
title = {Secrecy-Oriented First-Order Logical Analysis of Cryptographic Protocols},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2010/080},
year = {2010},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2010/080}
}
