Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2010/023
Differential Fault Analysis on AES with 192 and 256-Bit Keys
Junko Takahashi and Toshinori Fukunaga
Abstract: This paper describes a differential fault analysis (DFA) on AES with 192 and 256-bit keys. We show a new attack in which both 192 and 256-bit keys are retrieved within a feasible computational time. In order to verify the proposed attack and estimate the calculation time, we implement the proposed attack using C code on a PC. As a result, we successfully recover the original 192-bit key using 3 pairs of correct and faulty ciphertexts within 5 minutes, and 256-bit key using 2 pairs of correct and faulty ciphertexts and 2 pairs of correct and faulty plaintexts within 10 minutes.
Category / Keywords: secret-key cryptography /
Publication Info: This paper is the English version of the publication in the Japanese domestic symposium, Symposium on Cryptography and Information Security, SCIS 2010, which will be held on Jan. 19-22, 2010.
Date: received 15 Jan 2010
Contact author: takahashi junko at lab ntt co jp
Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation
Version: 20100116:062510 (All versions of this report)
Short URL: ia.cr/2010/023
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