Differential Fault Analysis on AES with 192 and 256-Bit Keys

Junko Takahashi; Toshinori Fukunaga

Paper 2010/023

Differential Fault Analysis on AES with 192 and 256-Bit Keys

Junko Takahashi and Toshinori Fukunaga

Abstract

This paper describes a differential fault analysis (DFA) on AES with 192 and 256-bit keys. We show a new attack in which both 192 and 256-bit keys are retrieved within a feasible computational time. In order to verify the proposed attack and estimate the calculation time, we implement the proposed attack using C code on a PC. As a result, we successfully recover the original 192-bit key using 3 pairs of correct and faulty ciphertexts within 5 minutes, and 256-bit key using 2 pairs of correct and faulty ciphertexts and 2 pairs of correct and faulty plaintexts within 10 minutes.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Secret-key cryptography
Publication info: Published elsewhere. This paper is the English version of the publication in the Japanese domestic symposium, Symposium on Cryptography and Information Security, SCIS 2010, which will be held on Jan. 19-22, 2010.
Contact author(s): takahashi junko @ lab ntt co jp
History: 2010-01-16: received
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2010/023
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2010/023,
      author = {Junko Takahashi and Toshinori Fukunaga},
      title = {Differential Fault Analysis on {AES} with 192 and 256-Bit Keys},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2010/023},
      year = {2010},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2010/023}
}