Paper 2009/620
Security of ECQV-Certified ECDSA Against Passive Adversaries
Daniel R. L. Brown, Matthew J. Campagna, and Scott A. Vanstone
Abstract
We show that the elliptic curve Qu-Vanstone implicit certificate scheme (ECQV), when composed with the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA), is secure against passive adversaries under the combined assumption of the random oracle model and the generic group model,---if the ECQV certificate itself is excluded from the signable message space, because of an attack of Kravitz. In contrast, we detail an attack on the composition of another implicit certificate scheme, proposed by Pintsov and Vanstone for Optimal Mail Certificates (OMC), and ECDSA. This composition attack forges an implicitly certified ECDSA signature, and is passive in the sense of needing no interaction with the signer or the certification authority. (Pintsov and Vanstone did not propose combining OMC with ECDSA.)
Note: Corrections to address an attack by David Kravitz. (Further correction to eprint version of abstract.)
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Public-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
- Keywords
- digital signatureselliptic curve cryptosystemECDSAcertificatescomposition
- Contact author(s)
- dbrown @ certicom com
- History
- 2011-03-09: last of 3 revisions
- 2009-12-17: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2009/620
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2009/620,
author = {Daniel R. L. Brown and Matthew J. Campagna and Scott A. Vanstone},
title = {Security of {ECQV}-Certified {ECDSA} Against Passive Adversaries},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2009/620},
year = {2009},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2009/620}
}
