Public-Key Cryptographic Primitives Provably as Secure as Subset Sum

Vadim Lyubashevsky; Adriana Palacio; Gil Segev

Paper 2009/576

Public-Key Cryptographic Primitives Provably as Secure as Subset Sum

Vadim Lyubashevsky, Adriana Palacio, and Gil Segev

Abstract

We propose a semantically-secure public-key encryption scheme whose security is polynomial-time equivalent to the hardness of solving random instances of the subset sum problem. The subset sum assumption required for the security of our scheme is weaker than that of existing subset-sum based encryption schemes, namely the lattice-based schemes of Ajtai and Dwork (STOC '97), Regev (STOC '03, STOC '05), and Peikert (STOC '09). Additionally, our proof of security is simple and direct. We also present a natural variant of our scheme that is secure against key-leakage attacks, as well as an oblivious transfer protocol that is secure against semi-honest adversaries.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Public-key cryptography
Publication info: Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Keywords: subset sum cryptosystem oblivious transfer
Contact author(s): vlyubash @ cs ucsd edu
History: 2009-12-01: received
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2009/576
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2009/576,
      author = {Vadim Lyubashevsky and Adriana Palacio and Gil Segev},
      title = {Public-Key Cryptographic Primitives Provably as Secure as Subset Sum},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2009/576},
      year = {2009},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2009/576}
}