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Paper 2009/568

Ephemeral key compromise attack on the IB-KA protocol

Qingfeng Cheng and Chuangui Ma

Abstract

Recently, Dario Fiore and Rosario Gennaro proposed the IB-KA protocol, which was inspired by MQV protocol. They provide a full proof of security of IB-KA protocol using techniques developed by Krawczyk in the Canetti-Krawczyk model. They designed the IB-KA protocol with some security properties such as perfect forward secrecy, reflection attack resilience, and key compromise impersonation resilience. But they didn't consider ephemeral key compromise problem in the design of IB-KA protocol, and made no analysis whether the IB-KA protocol can resist ephemeral key compromise attacks. In this paper, we present ephemeral key compromise attack on the the IB-KA protocol. Our work shows that the IB-KA protocol is designed without ephemeral key compromise resilience.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Keywords
Ephemeral key compromise attackAuthenticated key exchangeCanetti-Krawczyk model
Contact author(s)
qingfengc2008 @ sina com
History
2009-11-23: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2009/568
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY
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