Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2009/568

Ephemeral key compromise attack on the IB-KA protocol

Qingfeng Cheng and Chuangui Ma

Abstract: Recently, Dario Fiore and Rosario Gennaro proposed the IB-KA protocol, which was inspired by MQV protocol. They provide a full proof of security of IB-KA protocol using techniques developed by Krawczyk in the Canetti-Krawczyk model. They designed the IB-KA protocol with some security properties such as perfect forward secrecy, reflection attack resilience, and key compromise impersonation resilience. But they didn't consider ephemeral key compromise problem in the design of IB-KA protocol, and made no analysis whether the IB-KA protocol can resist ephemeral key compromise attacks. In this paper, we present ephemeral key compromise attack on the the IB-KA protocol. Our work shows that the IB-KA protocol is designed without ephemeral key compromise resilience.

Category / Keywords: cryptographic protocols / Ephemeral key compromise attack; Authenticated key exchange; Canetti-Krawczyk model

Date: received 15 Nov 2009

Contact author: qingfengc2008 at sina com

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20091123:170638 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2009/568

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