Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2009/529

Oblivious Transfer with Access Control

Jan Camenisch and Maria Dubovitskaya and Gregory Neven

Abstract: We present a protocol for anonymous access to a database where the different records have different access control permissions. These permissions could be attributes, roles, or rights that the user needs to have in order to access the record. Our protocol offers maximal security guarantees for both the database and the user, namely (1) only authorized users can access the record; (2) the database provider does not learn which record the user accesses; and (3) the database provider does not learn which attributes or roles the user has when she accesses the database.

We prove our protocol secure in the standard model (i.e., without random oracles) under the bilinear Diffie-Hellman exponent and the strong Diffie-Hellman assumptions.

Category / Keywords: cryptographic protocols / oblivious transfer, anonymous credentials

Publication Info: To appear at ACM CCS 2009.

Date: received 2 Nov 2009

Contact author: nev at zurich ibm com

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20091102:204024 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2009/529

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