Blake-Wilson, Johnson and Menezes Protocol Revisited

Hai Huang; Zhenfu Cao

Paper 2009/515

Blake-Wilson, Johnson and Menezes Protocol Revisited

Hai Huang and Zhenfu Cao

Abstract

In this paper, we investigate the famous Blake-Wilson, Johnson \& Menezes (BJM) authenticated key exchange protocols. We observe that the Corrupt query in the BJM model is not very reasonable, i.e. it fails to model the adversary's capability well. We modify the BJM model by providing it with a new Corrupt query. By this way, we bring the BJM model further to the practice. Besides, our modification has a significant impact on the security proofs of the BJM protocols. Specifically, the security proofs using CDH assumption will no longer work in the modified BJM model.With slight modification, we show that the BJM protocols are secure in the modified BJM model under the gap Diffie-Hellman assumption (GDH).

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Publication info: Published elsewhere. submitted to some journal
Keywords: Authenticated key exchange Provably secure BJM protocol Gap Diffie-Hellman Assumption
Contact author(s): chinesechess @ sjtu edu cn
History: 2009-10-26: received
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2009/515
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2009/515,
      author = {Hai Huang and Zhenfu Cao},
      title = {Blake-Wilson, Johnson and Menezes Protocol Revisited},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2009/515},
      year = {2009},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2009/515}
}