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Paper 2009/500
Key Recovery Attack on QuiSci
Nils Reimers
Abstract
This paper shows a key recovery attack on QuiSci (quick stream cipher), designed by Stefan Müller (FGAN-FHR, a German research institute) in 2001. With one or few know plaintexts it's possible to recover most of the key with negligible time complexity. This paper shows a way how to exploit the weak key setup of QuiSci.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
- PDF PS
- Category
- Secret-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
- Keywords
- cryptanalysiskey recoverystream cipher
- Contact author(s)
- Rnils @ web de
- History
- 2009-10-20: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2009/500
- License
-
CC BY