Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2009/500
Key Recovery Attack on QuiSci
Abstract: This paper shows a key recovery attack on QuiSci (quick stream cipher), designed by Stefan Müller (FGAN-FHR, a German research institute) in 2001. With one or few know plaintexts it's possible to recover most of the key with negligible time complexity.
This paper shows a way how to exploit the weak key setup of QuiSci.
Category / Keywords: secret-key cryptography / cryptanalysis, key recovery, stream cipher
Date: received 11 Oct 2009
Contact author: Rnils at web de
Available format(s): Postscript (PS) | Compressed Postscript (PS.GZ) | PDF | BibTeX Citation
Version: 20091020:105322 (All versions of this report)
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