We study the second strategy by determining the exact security property needed in the encryption to achieve secure constructions. This study infers the exclusion of a useful type of encryption from the design due to an intrinsic weakness in the paradigm. Next, we propose a simple method to remediate to this weakness and we get efficient constructions which can be used with \emph{any} digital signature.
Category / Keywords: Designated Confirmer signatures, ``Signature of a commitment'' paradigm, Generic construction, Reduction/meta-reduction, Zero Knowledge. Date: received 4 Sep 2009, last revised 24 Nov 2009 Contact author: elaimani at bit uni-bonn de Available format(s): Postscript (PS) | Compressed Postscript (PS.GZ) | PDF | BibTeX Citation Version: 20091124:163915 (All versions of this report) Short URL: ia.cr/2009/435 Discussion forum: Show discussion | Start new discussion