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Paper 2009/408

A Secure and Efficient Authenticated Diffie–Hellman Protocol

Augustin P. Sarr and Philippe Elbaz–Vincent, and Jean–Claude Bajard

Abstract

The Exponential Challenge Response (XRC) and Dual Exponential Challenge Response (DCR) signature schemes are the building blocks of the HMQV protocol. We propose a complementary analysis of these schemes; on the basis of this analysis we show how impersonation and man in the middle attacks can be mounted against the HMQV protocol when some session specific information leakages happen. We define the Full Exponential Challenge Response (FXRC) and Full Dual Exponential Challenge Response (FDCR) signature schemes; using these schemes we propose the Fully Hashed MQV protocol (with security arguments), which preserves the remarkable performance of the (H)MQV protocols and resists the attacks we present.

Note: Typographical corrections

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF PS
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Published elsewhere. A short version of this paper is accepted to EuroPKI 2009
Keywords
security model(H)MQVsession secret leakageimpersonation Attack
Contact author(s)
aug sarr @ gmail com
History
2012-01-05: last of 7 revisions
2009-08-24: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2009/408
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY
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