Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2009/408
A Secure and Efficient Authenticated Diffie–Hellman Protocol
Augustin P. Sarr and Philippe Elbaz–Vincent, and Jean–Claude Bajard
Abstract: The Exponential Challenge Response (XRC) and Dual Exponential Challenge Response (DCR) signature schemes are the building blocks of the HMQV protocol. We propose a complementary analysis of these schemes; on the basis of this analysis we show how impersonation and man in the middle attacks can be mounted against the HMQV protocol when some session specific information leakages happen.
We define the Full Exponential Challenge Response (FXRC) and Full Dual Exponential Challenge Response (FDCR) signature schemes; using these schemes we propose the Fully Hashed MQV protocol (with security arguments), which preserves the remarkable performance of the (H)MQV protocols and resists the attacks we present.
Category / Keywords: cryptographic protocols / security model, (H)MQV, session secret leakage, impersonation Attack
Publication Info: A short version of this paper is accepted to EuroPKI 2009
Date: received 21 Aug 2009, last revised 5 Jan 2012
Contact author: aug sarr at gmail com
Available format(s): Postscript (PS) | Compressed Postscript (PS.GZ) | PDF | BibTeX Citation
Note: Typographical corrections
Version: 20120105:131341 (All versions of this report)
Short URL: ia.cr/2009/408
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