Paper 2009/397
Linear Cryptanalysis of Reduced-Round PRESENT
Joo Yeon Cho
Abstract
PRESENT is a hardware-oriented block cipher suitable for resource constrained environment. In this paper we analyze PRESENT by the multidimensional linear cryptanalysis method. We claim that our attack can recover the 80-bit secret key of PRESENT up to 25 rounds out of 31 rounds with around $2^{62.4}$ data complexity. Furthermore, we showed that the 26-round version of PRESENT can be attacked faster than key exhaustive search with the $2^{64}$ data complexity by an advanced key search technique. Our results are superior to all the previous attacks. We demonstrate our result by performing the linear attacks on reduced variants of PRESENT. Our results exemplify that the performance of the multidimensional linear attack is superior compared to the classical linear attack.
Note: Section 3.2 and 3.3 have been revised. Thanks to Kaisa Nyberg.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
PS
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. CT-RSA 2010
- Keywords
- Block CiphersLightweight CryptographyPRESENTMultidimensional Linear Cryptanalysis
- Contact author(s)
- joo cho @ tkk fi
- History
- 2010-01-25: last of 4 revisions
- 2009-08-15: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2009/397
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2009/397,
author = {Joo Yeon Cho},
title = {Linear Cryptanalysis of Reduced-Round {PRESENT}},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2009/397},
year = {2009},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2009/397}
}
