Linear Cryptanalysis of Reduced-Round PRESENT

Joo Yeon Cho

Paper 2009/397

Linear Cryptanalysis of Reduced-Round PRESENT

Joo Yeon Cho

Abstract

PRESENT is a hardware-oriented block cipher suitable for resource constrained environment. In this paper we analyze PRESENT by the multidimensional linear cryptanalysis method. We claim that our attack can recover the 80-bit secret key of PRESENT up to 25 rounds out of 31 rounds with around $2^{62.4}$ data complexity. Furthermore, we showed that the 26-round version of PRESENT can be attacked faster than key exhaustive search with the data complexity by an advanced key search technique. Our results are superior to all the previous attacks. We demonstrate our result by performing the linear attacks on reduced variants of PRESENT. Our results exemplify that the performance of the multidimensional linear attack is superior compared to the classical linear attack.

Note: Section 3.2 and 3.3 have been revised. Thanks to Kaisa Nyberg.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF PS
Publication info: Published elsewhere. CT-RSA 2010
Keywords: Block Ciphers Lightweight Cryptography PRESENT Multidimensional Linear Cryptanalysis
Contact author(s): joo cho @ tkk fi
History: 2010-01-25: last of 4 revisions; 2009-08-15: received; See all versions
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2009/397
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2009/397,
      author = {Joo Yeon Cho},
      title = {Linear Cryptanalysis of Reduced-Round {PRESENT}},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2009/397},
      year = {2009},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2009/397}
}