1) Adaptive zero-knowledge proofs: We ask whether it is possible to construct adaptive zero-knowledge proofs (with unconditional soundness). Beaver (STOC 1996) showed that known zero-knowledge proofs are not adaptively secure, and in addition showed how to construct zero-knowledge arguments (with computational soundness).
2) Adaptively secure oblivious transfer: All known protocols for adaptively secure oblivious transfer rely on seemingly stronger hardness assumptions than for the case of static adversaries. We ask whether this is inherent, and in particular, whether it is possible to construct adaptively secure oblivious transfer from enhanced trapdoor permutations alone.
We provide surprising answers to the above questions, showing that achieving adaptive security is sometimes harder than achieving static security, and sometimes not. First, we show that assuming the existence of one-way functions only, there exist adaptive zero-knowledge proofs for all languages in NP. In order to prove this, we overcome the problem that all adaptive zero-knowledge protocols known until now used equivocal commitments (which would enable an all-powerful prover to cheat). Second, we prove a black-box separation between adaptively secure oblivious transfer and enhanced trapdoor permutations. As a corollary, we derive a black-box separation between adaptively and statically securely oblivious transfer. This is the first black-box separation to relate to adaptive security and thus the first evidence that it is indeed harder to achieve security in the presence of adaptive adversaries than in the presence of static adversaries.Category / Keywords: foundations / Adaptive security, black-box separations, zero-knowledge, oblivious transfer Publication Info: An extended abstract appeared at TCC 2009; this is the full version. Date: received 22 Jul 2009, last revised 28 Jul 2009 Contact author: zarosih at cs biu ac il Available format(s): Postscript (PS) | Compressed Postscript (PS.GZ) | PDF | BibTeX Citation Version: 20090728:130809 (All versions of this report) Short URL: ia.cr/2009/366 Discussion forum: Show discussion | Start new discussion