Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2009/352

On the Duality of Probing and Fault Attacks

Berndt M. Gammel and Stefan Mangard

Abstract: In this work we investigate the problem of simultaneous privacy and integrity protection in cryptographic circuits. We consider a white-box scenario with a powerful, yet limited attacker. A concise metric for the level of probing and fault security is introduced, which is directly related to the capabilities of a realistic attacker. In order to investigate the interrelation of probing and fault security we introduce a common mathematical framework based on the formalism of information and coding theory. The framework unifies the known linear masking schemes. We proof a central theorem about the properties of linear codes which leads to optimal secret sharing schemes. These schemes provide the lower bound for the number of masks needed to counteract an attacker with a given strength. The new formalism reveals an intriguing duality principle between the problems of probing and fault security, and provides a unified view on privacy and integrity protection using error detecting codes. Finally, we introduce a new class of linear tamper-resistant codes. These are eligible to preserve security against an attacker mounting simultaneous probing and fault attacks.

Category / Keywords: foundations / probing attacks, fault attacks, side channel attacks, coding theory, secret sharing, secure computation

Date: received 17 Jul 2009

Contact author: berndt gammel at infineon com

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20090721:202605 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2009/352

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