Paper 2009/311

Multi Party Distributed Private Matching, Set Disjointness and Cardinality Set Intersection with Information Theoretic Security

Sathya Narayanan G, Aishwarya T, Anugrah Agrawal, Arpita Patra, Ashish Choudhary, and Pandu Rangan C

Abstract

In this paper, we focus on the specific problems of Private Matching, Set Disjointness and Cardinality Set Intersection in information theoretic settings. Specifically, we give perfectly secure protocols for the above problems in n party settings, tolerating a computational ly unbounded semi-honest adversary, who can passively corrupt at most t < n/2 parties. To the best of our knowledge, these are the first such information theoretically secure protocols in a multi-party setting for all three problems. Previous solutions for Distributed Private Matching and Cardinality Set Intersection were cryptographical ly secure and the previous Set Disjointness solution, though information theoretically secure, is in a two party setting. We also propose a new model for Distributed Private matching which is relevant in a multi-party setting.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Keywords
Privacy preserving Set operationsMultiparty Computation
Contact author(s)
arpita @ cse iitm ernet in
sathya phoenix @ gmail com
prangan55 @ gmail com
History
2009-07-01: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2009/311
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2009/311,
      author = {Sathya Narayanan G and Aishwarya T and Anugrah Agrawal and Arpita Patra and Ashish Choudhary and Pandu Rangan C},
      title = {Multi Party Distributed Private Matching, Set Disjointness and Cardinality Set Intersection with Information Theoretic Security},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2009/311},
      year = {2009},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2009/311}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2009/311}
}
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