Paper 2009/295

Defending Against Key Abuse Attacks in KP-ABE Enabled Broadcast Systems

Shucheng Yu, Kui Ren, Wenjing Lou, and Jin Li

Abstract

Key-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption (KP-ABE) is a promising cryptographic primitive which enables fine-grained access control over sensitive data. However, key abuse attacks in KP-ABE may impede its wide application especially in copyright-sensitive systems. To defend against this kind of attacks, this paper proposes a novel KP-ABE scheme which is able to disclose any illegal key distributor’s ID when key abuse is detected. In our scheme, each bit of user ID is defined as an attribute and the user secret key is associated with his unique ID. The tracing algorithm fulfills its task by tricking the pirate device into decrypting the ciphertext associated with the corresponding bits of his ID. Our proposed scheme has the salient property of black box tracing, i.e., it traces back to the illegal key distributor’s ID only by observing the pirate device’s outputs on certain inputs. In addition, it does not require the pirate device’s secret keys to be well-formed as compared to some previous work. Our proposed scheme is provably secure under the Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) assumption and the Decisional Linear (DL) assumption.

Note: This is the revised version to the previous one.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Public-key cryptography
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Accepted by securecomm 2009.
Keywords
attribute-based encryptiontraitor tracingbroadcast
Contact author(s)
yscheng @ wpi edu
History
2009-07-01: last of 2 revisions
2009-06-24: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2009/295
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2009/295,
      author = {Shucheng Yu and Kui Ren and Wenjing Lou and Jin Li},
      title = {Defending Against Key Abuse Attacks in {KP}-{ABE} Enabled Broadcast Systems},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2009/295},
      year = {2009},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2009/295}
}
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