Modeling Key Compromise Impersonation Attacks on Group Key Exchange Protocols

M.  Choudary Gorantla; Colin Boyd; Juan Manuel González Nieto

Paper 2009/291

Modeling Key Compromise Impersonation Attacks on Group Key Exchange Protocols

M. Choudary Gorantla, Colin Boyd, and Juan Manuel González Nieto

Abstract

A key exchange protocol allows a set of parties to agree upon a secret session key over a public network. Two-party key exchange (2PKE) protocols have been rigorously analyzed under various models considering different adversarial actions. However, the analysis of group key exchange (GKE) protocols has not been as extensive as that of 2PKE protocols. Particularly, the security attribute of key compromise impersonation (KCI) resilience has so far been ignored for the case of GKE protocols. We first model the security of GKE protocols addressing KCI attacks by both outsider and insider adversaries. We then show that a few existing protocols are not secure even against outsider KCI attacks. The attacks on these protocols demonstrate the necessity of considering KCI resilience for GKE protocols. Finally, we give a new proof of security for an existing GKE protocol under the revised model assuming random oracles.

Note: Typos corrected. Notations have been made consistent.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF PS
Category: Cryptographic protocols
Publication info: Published elsewhere. PKC 2009
Keywords: Group Key Exchange Key Compromise Impersonation Insider Attacks
Contact author(s): mc gorantla @ isi qut edu au
History: 2009-06-17: received
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2009/291
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2009/291,
      author = {M.  Choudary Gorantla and Colin Boyd and Juan Manuel González Nieto},
      title = {Modeling Key Compromise Impersonation Attacks on Group Key Exchange Protocols},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2009/291},
      year = {2009},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2009/291}
}