At ESAS 2007, the End-by-Hop protocol for securing in-network aggregation for sensor nodes was presented. The solution was claimed to be secure and efficient and to provide the possibility of trading off bandwidth against computation time on the server.
In this paper, we disprove these claims. We describe several attacks against the proposed solution and point out shortcomings in the original complexity analysis. In particular, we show that the proposed solution is inferior to a naive solution without in-network aggregation both in security and in efficiency.Category / Keywords: cryptographic protocols / cryptanalysis, sensor networks, protocols Publication Info: DTU MAT report no. 2009-01 Date: received 11 Jun 2009, last revised 17 Jun 2009 Contact author: e zenner at mat dtu dk Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation Version: 20090617:151029 (All versions of this report) Short URL: ia.cr/2009/289 Discussion forum: Show discussion | Start new discussion