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Paper 2009/235

Breaking and Fixing of an Identity Based Multi-Signcryption Scheme

S.Sharmila Deva Selvi and S.Sree Vivek and C.Pandu Rangan

Abstract

Signcryption is a cryptographic primitive that provides authentication and confidentiality simultaneously in a single logical step. It is often required that multiple senders have to signcrypt a single message to a certain receiver. Obviously, it is inefficient to signcrypt the messages separately. An efficient alternative is to go for multi-signcryption. The concept of multi-signcryption is similar to that of multi-signatures with the added property - confidentiality. Recently, Jianhong et al. proposed an identity based multi-signcryption scheme. They claimed that their scheme is secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack and it is existentially unforgeable. In this paper, we show that their scheme is not secure against chosen plaintext attack and is existentially forgeable, we also provide a fix for the scheme and prove formally that the improved scheme is secure against both adaptive chosen ciphertext attack and existential forgery.

Metadata
Available format(s)
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Publication info
Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Keywords
Identity Based CryptographySigncryptionCryptanalysisMulti-SigncryptionBilinear PairingProvable SecurityRandom Oracle Model.
Contact author(s)
ssreevivek @ gmail com,sharmioshin @ gmail com
History
2009-08-06: revised
2009-05-30: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2009/235
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY
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