Strongly Secure Certificateless Key Agreement

Georg Lippold; Colin Boyd; Juan González Nieto

Paper 2009/219

Strongly Secure Certificateless Key Agreement

Georg Lippold, Colin Boyd, and Juan González Nieto

Abstract

We introduce a formal model for certificateless authenticated key exchange (CL-AKE) protocols. Contrary to what might be expected, we show that the natural combination of an ID-based AKE protocol with a public key based AKE protocol cannot provide strong security. We provide the first one-round CL-AKE scheme proven secure in the random oracle model. We introduce two variants of the Diffie-Hellman trapdoor introduced by \cite{DBLP:conf/eurocrypt/CashKS08}. The proposed key agreement scheme is secure as long as each party has at least one uncompromised secret. Thus, our scheme is secure even if the key generation centre learns the ephemeral secrets of both parties.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Cryptographic protocols
Publication info: Published elsewhere. Pairing 2009 accepted paper
Keywords: public key cryptography key exchange certificateless key agreement random oracle model eCK Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Trapdoor proof
Contact author(s): g lippold @ qut edu au
History: 2010-07-27: last of 5 revisions; 2009-05-26: received; See all versions
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2009/219
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2009/219,
      author = {Georg Lippold and Colin Boyd and Juan González Nieto},
      title = {Strongly Secure Certificateless Key Agreement},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2009/219},
      year = {2009},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2009/219}
}