Paper 2009/175
Concrete Security for Entity Recognition: The Jane Doe Protocol (Full Paper)
Stefan Lucks, Erik Zenner, Andre Weimerskirch, and Dirk Westhoff
Abstract
Entity recognition does not ask whether the message is from some entity X, just whether a message is from the same entity as a previous message. This turns turns out to be very useful for low-end devices. Motivated by an attack against a protocol presented at SAC 2003, the current paper proposes a new protocol -- the ``Jane Doe Protocol'' --, and provides a formal proof of its concrete security. The protocol neither employs asymmetric cryptography, nor a trusted third party, nor any key pre-distribution. It is suitable for light-weight cryptographic devices such as sensor network motes and RFID tags.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. An extended abstract has been published: S. Lucks, E. Zenner, A. Weimerskirch and D. Westhoff ``Concrete Security for Entity Recognition: The Jane Doe Protocol'', Indocrypt 2008. This is the full version of the paper.
- Keywords
- secret-key cryptographyidentification protocolshash functionsmessage authentication codes
- Contact author(s)
- Stefan Lucks @ uni-weimar de
- History
- 2009-04-23: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2009/175
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2009/175,
author = {Stefan Lucks and Erik Zenner and Andre Weimerskirch and Dirk Westhoff},
title = {Concrete Security for Entity Recognition: The Jane Doe Protocol (Full Paper)},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2009/175},
year = {2009},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2009/175}
}
