Paper 2009/133

Signature Schemes with Bounded Leakage Resilience

Jonathan Katz

Abstract

A leakage-resilient cryptosystem remains secure even if arbitrary information about the secret key (or possibly other internal state information) is leaked to an adversary. We demonstrate the first constructions of leakage-resilient signature schemes that remain secure as long as a bounded amount of information, depending on the length n of the secret key, is leaked. We show efficient schemes in the random oracle model that handle leakage of up to (1/2ϵ)n bits of information about the signer's entire internal state. In the standard model, we show an inefficient scheme that can handle leakage of up to (1ϵ)n bits of information about the secret key, and a one-time signature scheme tolerating arbitrary leakage of n1ϵ bits.

Metadata
Available format(s)
-- withdrawn --
Category
Public-key cryptography
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Keywords
memory attackssignatures
Contact author(s)
jkatz @ cs umd edu
History
2009-03-30: withdrawn
2009-03-27: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2009/133
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY
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