Paper 2009/105
Public-Key Cryptosystems Resilient to Key Leakage
Moni Naor and Gil Segev
Abstract
Most of the work in the analysis of cryptographic schemes is concentrated in abstract adversarial models that do not capture {\em side-channel attacks}. Such attacks exploit various forms of unintended information leakage, which is inherent to almost all physical implementations. Inspired by recent side-channel attacks, especially the ``cold boot attacks'' of Halderman et al. (USENIX
Security '08), Akavia, Goldwasser and Vaikuntanathan (TCC '09) formalized a realistic framework for modeling the security of encryption schemes against a wide class of side-channel attacks in which adversarially chosen functions of the secret key are leaked. In the setting of public-key encryption, Akavia et al. showed that Regev's lattice-based scheme (STOC '05) is resilient to any leakage of
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Foundations
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
- Keywords
- Public-key encryptionside-channel attacks
- Contact author(s)
- gil segev @ microsoft com
- History
- 2012-05-30: last of 6 revisions
- 2009-03-11: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2009/105
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2009/105, author = {Moni Naor and Gil Segev}, title = {Public-Key Cryptosystems Resilient to Key Leakage}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2009/105}, year = {2009}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2009/105} }