Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2009/101

Encryption Schemes Secure under Selective Opening Attack

Mihir Bellare and Scott Yilek

Abstract: The existence of encryption schemes secure under selective opening attack (SOA) has remained open despite considerable interest and attention. We provide the first public key encryption schemes secure against sender corruptions in this setting. The underlying tool is lossy encryption. The schemes have short keys. (Public and secret keys of a fixed length suffice for encrypting an arbitrary number of messages.) The schemes are stateless and noninteractive, and security does not rely on erasures. The schemes are without random oracles, proven secure under standard assumptions (DDH, Paillier’s DCR, QR, lattices), and even efficient. We are able to meet both an indistinguishability (IND-SO-ENC) and a simulation-style, semantic security (SEM-SO-ENC) definition.

Category / Keywords: encryption, selective opening, lossy trapdoor functions, DDH

Publication Info: A preliminary version of this paper appears as part of our Eurocrypt 2009 paper with Dennis Hofheinz

Date: received 27 Feb 2009, last revised 2 Mar 2009

Contact author: syilek at cs ucsd edu

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Version: 20090302:171653 (All versions of this report)

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