Non-malleability of one-way functions and hash functions has surfaced as a crucial property in several recent results, but it has not undergone a comprehensive treatment so far. In this paper we initiate the study of such non-malleable functions. We start with the design of an appropriate security definition. We then show that non-malleability for hash and one-way functions can be achieved, via a theoretical construction that uses perfectly one-way hash functions and simulation-sound non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge (NIZKPoK).
We also discuss the complexity of non-malleable hash and one-way functions. Specifically, we give a black-box based separation of non-malleable functions from one-way permutations (which our construction bypasses due to the 'non-black-box' NIZKPoK). We exemplify the usefulness of our definition in cryptographic applications by showing that non-malleability is necessary and sufficient to securely replace one of the two random oracles in the IND-CCA encryption scheme by Bellare and Rogaway, and to improve the security of client-server puzzles.Category / Keywords: foundations / Non-malleability, hash function, perfect one-wayness. Date: received 9 Feb 2009 Contact author: marc fischlin at gmail com Available format(s): Postscript (PS) | Compressed Postscript (PS.GZ) | PDF | BibTeX Citation Version: 20090210:212501 (All versions of this report) Short URL: ia.cr/2009/065 Discussion forum: Show discussion | Start new discussion