Paper 2009/064
On the Data Complexity of Statistical Attacks Against Block Ciphers (full version)
Céline Blondeau and Benoît Gérard
Abstract
Many attacks on iterated block ciphers rely on statistical considerations using plaintext/ciphertext pairs to distinguish some part of the cipher from a random permutation. We provide here a simple formula for estimating the amount of plaintext/ciphertext pairs which is needed for such distinguishers and which applies to a lot of different scenarios (linear cryptanalysis, differential-linear cryptanalysis, differential/truncated differential/impossible differential cryptanalysis). The asymptotic data complexities of all these attacks are then derived. Moreover, we give an efficient algorithm for computing the data complexity accurately.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
- Category
- Secret-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
- Keywords
- statistical cryptanalysisiterated block cipherdata complexity.
- Contact author(s)
- celine blondeau @ inria fr
- History
- 2009-02-12: last of 2 revisions
- 2009-02-10: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2009/064
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2009/064, author = {Céline Blondeau and Benoît Gérard}, title = {On the Data Complexity of Statistical Attacks Against Block Ciphers (full version)}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2009/064}, year = {2009}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2009/064} }